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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ADRIANA CORNELIA PEARSON ) 
Plaintiff-Appellant ) 
VS. 
CASE NO. 17094 
) 
KIMBER LEE PEARSON 
Defendant-Respondent ) 
-------------------·--------------
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the Judgment of the District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Jud5e 
RANDY S. LUDLOW 
325 South Third East 
NEILS E. MORTENSON 
255 East 400 South 
Suite 210 
Salt Lake City,Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
Kimber Lee Pearson 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Adriana Cornelia Pearson 
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ADRIANA 
vs. 
KIMBER 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
CORNELIA PEARSON, ) 
Plaintiff-Appellant ) 
) CASE NO. 
LEE PEARSON, ) 
Defendant-Respondent. ) 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
17094 
A Motion by a divorced husband to set aside Default 
Judgment entered in the Decree of Divorce was granted by 
the Court and from the granting of that Motion this Appeal 
has arisen. 
DISPOSITION IN A LOWER COURT 
The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup set aside the Decree 
of Divorce previously entered pursuant to a Default. 
RELIEF SOUGHT BY RESPONDENT 
Defendant-Respondent seeks to have this Appeal 
dismissed due to the fact that there is no final Judgment 
or in the alternative, for an Order upholding and sustaining 
the Order entered by Judge Rigtrup setting aside the Decree of 
Divorce. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were husband and wife and initially filed 
a Divorce Complaint in 1977 and later reconciled. ( R-2 ) • 
An Amended Complaint for Divorce was filed in February 
of 1979. ( R-16 ) Defendant-Respondent went to the 
Law Office of Plaintiff's attorney and, at that visit, 
accepted and signed an Acceptance of Service and Consent to 
Default. Defendant understood that the purpose of signing the 
Acceptance of Service Form was to eliminate the need for him 
to appear in Court. After he had accepted service of the 
Summons and Complaint, Defendant-Respondent, Plaintiff and 
Plaintiff's attorney did have a discussion in Plaintiff 
attorney's law office and an agreement was reached between 
the parties settling all the terms and conditions of the 
Divorce. Said agreement was substantially different from the-
allegations contained in the Amended Complaint ( R-35 ). 
Defendant never executed a Stipulation, Waiver and Property 
Settlement Agreement setting forth the exact terms and condi-
tions of the agreement between the parties and never received 
a copy of the Decree of Divorce, even though one had been re-
quested. ( R-35 ) . 
At the time the Defendant-Respondent was preparing to 
enter into another marriage in July of 1979 he reviewed the 
Divorce file and discovered that the Decree did not conform to 
the agreement between the parties and had been taken on a 
Default basis and based solely upon those allegations in the 
Amended Complaint. ( R-35 & R-28 ). Defendant-Respondent 
. 
had no knowledge of the discrepancy between the Decree as granted 
I'>\ 
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and the agreement between the parties prior to July 26, 1979. 
( R-36 ) Defendant-Respondent immediately contacted 
an attorne~ a Motion to Set Aside the Decree or to modify the 
same was brought before the Court and that Motion was granted. 
( R-39 I R-54 ) • 
At no time did the Defendant agree to the specific terms 
and conditions of the Amended Complaint. And at no time was a 
Stipulation, Waiver and Property Settlement Agreement prepared 
and entered into by the parties. 
After this Appeal was filed Defendant-Respondent filed 
a Motion to Dismiss based upon the fact that there was no final 
Judgment from which Plaintiff-Appellant could appeal. 
That Motion was tentatively denied by this Court with 
final ruling differed until hearing on the merits. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
GRANTING OF A MOTION TO SET ASIDE A DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
IS NOT A FINAL RULING FROM WHICH APPEAL CAN BE TAKEN 
AND THEREFORE THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED. 
The right to appeal is specifically set forth in Rule 
72 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and provides as 
follows: 
RULE 72 
RIGHT OF APPEAL; SCOPE OF REVIEW; PARTIES 
a. From final (Orders and) Judgments. 
An appeal may be taken to the Supreme 
Court from all final Orders and Judgments 
in accordance with these rules; .... 
Defendant submits that the granting of a Motion 
to Set Aside a Default Judgment and a Decree of Divorce is not 
(3) 
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a final order or a Judgment which can be appealed from. 
At this point in time there is not an Order of the Court 
specifically changing the terms and conditions of the 
original Decree and therefore the requisite finality has 
not been met. 
The general rule is set forth in 4 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Section 126 at 641 in which it is indicated: 
"Insofar as an Order granting such 
a Motion is concerned, the weight 
of the authority appears to be that, 
ordinarily, Appeal or Writ of Error 
will not lie to an Order merely 
vacating a former Judgment, such 
an Order not being final." 
Section 127 of the same authority indicates the 
following: 
"The Courts agree that an Order setting 
aside or refusing to set aside a default 
where Judgment has not been entered is 
not a final Order and therefore is not 
appealable unless it falls within the 
scope of a statutory provision allowing 
direct appeal from certain types of 
interlocutory_ decision." 
Defendant submits that no Judgment has been entered 
from which Plaintiff-Appellant can appeal and pursuant 
the general rule such an appeal can only be timely after 
the entry of such a Judgment. Defendant further submits 
that the nature of this appeal does not lend itself to 
an interlocutory appeal nor has permission been granted 
for such an appeal. 
This Court in the case of Baer v. Young, 25 U2d 198, 
479 P. 2d 351 (1971) indicated that an appeal from an Order 
setting aside a Default Judgment was interlocutory in nature 
and could not be appealed under Rule 72a 6£ the Utah Rule~ of 
ci11jl Procedure. 
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The setting aside of a Default Judgment entitles 
the Defendant to another hearinq on the merits in order 
to obtain a final Judgment or a Decree based upon that 
hearing. Therefore, the granting of a Motion to Set Aside 
Default Judgment is directly analoygousto the granting of 
a Motion for a new trial. The same general rules, as applied 
in a new trial situation apply in the granting of a 
Motion to Set Aside a Default. 4 Arn. Jur. 2d Section 123 at 
638 states the general rule as follows: 
"In the absence of statute requiring a different 
result, the general rule ·seems to be that there 
is no direct appeal from an Order denying or 
granting a Motion for a new trial. The hold-
ing that an Order denying or granting a Motion 
for a new trial is not directly appealable has 
usually been based on the ground of lack of 
finality of the particular decision." 
This Court has unheld the general rule and has so stated 
in the case of Haslam v. Paulsen, 15 U 2d 185, 389 P. 2d 736 
(1964), in which the Court stated as follows: 
"The Order granting a new trial is not a 
final Judgment, it but sets aside the 
verdict and places the parties in the 
same position as if there had been no 
previous trial." 
Defendant submits that the Plaintiff's appeal should 
be dismissed based upon the settled law in the State of 
Utah that an appeal under Rule 72a of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure cannot be made from a Motion granting relief 
from a Default. Plaintiff's only alternative would have been 
to seek an interlocutory appeal. 
(5) 
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POINT II 
THE COURT HAS SUFFICIENT GROUNDS TO SET ASIDE 
THE DEFAULT DIVORCE ENTERED IN THIS SITUATION 
UNDER RULE 60(b) 7 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE. 
Defendant brought this Motion under Rule 60(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Court 
_ specifically found that there were sufficient grounds 
under Rule 60{b)7, which provide relief from a Default 
may be had for "any other reason justifying relief from 
the operation of the Judgment." 
The Court after hearing the facts and circumstances 
and argument in this particular regard concluded that the 
facts and circumstances surrounding this Default did 
justify setting aside the Divorce Decree in numerous parti-
culars and of the Decree of Divorce appeared to be inequitable 
upon its face. 
This Court has stated the standard for granting of a 
Rule 60(b) Motion in the case of Warren v. Dixon Ranch 
Company, 123 Utah 416, 260 P. 2d 741, {1953)as follows: 
"The allowance of a vacation of a Judgment 
is a creature of equity designed to relieve 
against harshness of enforcing a Judgment, 
which may occur through procedural dif f i-
cul ties, the wrongs of the oposing party, 
or misfortunes which prevent the presentation 
of a claim or defense .... {A)n Equity Court 
• • • • may exercise wide judicial discretion 
in weighing the factors of fairness and public 
convenience, and this Court on appeal will 
reverse the trial Court only where an abuse 
of discretion is clearly shown". 
The Court heard argument in this particular regard 
and was convinced that there was sufficient grounds under 
the notion of equity to set aside this Judgment. The 
(6) 
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Decree of Divorce specifically awards the entire interest in 
the home of the parties to the Plaintiff, awards her majority 
of the personal property and obligates the Defendant to pay 
the majority of the debts and obligations of the parties. These 
factors considered in light of the fact that Defendant alleges 
that after the acceptance of the Summons and Complaint a 
discussion was had and an agreement reached substantially differ-
ing from the obligations in the Complaint gave the Court suf f i-
cient and substantial cause to set aside the Judgment entered 
herein. 
This Court in a recent case of Boyce v. Boyce No. 16342 
(filed March 5, 1980) indicated that : 
"A liberal standard for the application 
of Rule 60(b) in Divorce cases is justified 
by the Doctrine of Continuing Jurisdiction 
that a Divorce Court has over its Decrees. 
Clearly, -a Court should modify a prior Decree 
when the interests of equity and fair dealing 
with the Court and the opposing parties so 
require". 
Defendant submits that under the liberal standards set 
forth in the foregoing cases and the law in the State of Utah 
there was no abuse of discretion in setting aside this Decree. 
Plaintiff-Respondent sites the case of McGavin v. McGavin, 
27 U 2d 200, 494 P. 2d 283 (1972)in support of the proposition 
that there was an abuse of discretion by the District Court. 
Defendant submits that the McGavin case dealt specifically with 
the issue of paternity and fraud based upon that paternity. 
This Court indicated that in a situation of that nature a 
separate action could more readily handle the situation 
then a Motion to Set Aside the Decree of Divorce. Defendant 
submits that that is not the situation presently confronting 
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The issues are specifically those issues contained in the 
Decree of Divorce and not paternity issues as in the McGavin 
case. Defendant also reinterates that this Motion was granted 
under Rule 60(b) 7 and therefore the three (3) month provision 
relating to Rule 60(b) 1 through 4 is not applicable. 
Plaintiff-Appellant also argues that Defendant's 
Motion was denied under 60(b)(l)through(3). There is nothing 
in the_recor4 _indicating ~~id denial and, in fact, it is 
contrary to the ruling of the Court. Defendant alleged 
numerous grounds entitling him to relief under Rule 60(b) 
and the Court granted his Motion under Rule 60(b) 7. 
POINT III 
THE SITUATION IN THE PRESENT CASE IS SUBSTANTIALLY 
DIFFERENT FROM THE SITUATION IN WHICH THE PARTIES 
TO A DIVORCE HAVE EXECUTED AND SIGNED A STIPULATION 
WAIVER AND PROPERTY "SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT SPECIFICALLY 
CONTRACTING AND AGREEING TO ALL THE TERMS AND CONDI-
TIONS OF THE DIVORCE. 
In the present case no Stipulation, Waiver and Property 
Settlement Agreement was executed between the parties setting 
forth the specific terms and conditions to be incorporated in 
the Decree. Defendant was merely presented with a copy of the 
Summons and Complaint and he alleges that thereafter an agreement 
was reached between himself, his wife and his wife's attorney 
substantially modifying the terms contained in the Complaint. 
It was his understanding that the Acceptance of Service 
was merely for the purpose of eliminating his need to appear 
in Court. 
Plaintiff-Appellant cites the cases of Kessimakis v. 
Kessimakis, 546 :r. 2d 888 (1976) and Land v. Land,_ 605 P. 2d 
: ··- -~ 
(8) 
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1248 (1980} in support of their argument that the Court 
abused its discretion in this case. Defendant submits 
that in both the Kessimakis and the Land case specific 
stipulations had been entered into. In both of those 
cases a Stipulation, Waiver and Property Settlement Agree-
ment had been executed outlining all the specific terms and 
conditions of the Divorce and these same terms and conditions 
were then incorporated in the Decree. In that type of 
situation Plaintiff's argument concerning a contract between 
the parties bears substantial weight. In the present 
situation the Acceptance of Service by the Defendant certainly 
cannot be granted the same contractual weight as in those other 
cases. Even the quotation cited by Plaintiff-Appellant in 
regard to the Land case indicates : 
" •••. when a Decree is based on a property 
settlement • . . . " 
Therefore the principals enunciated in those cases do not 
apply to a situation in which no property settlement was 
arrived at. Defendant has alleged that a separate agreement 
was reached between the parties at the time he accepted service, 
but that agreement was not incorporated in the Decree of Divorce 
and that the Decree was inequitable and should be set aside. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant hereby submits that Plaintiff's Appeal 
should be dismissed for lack of a final judgment from which 
tn\ 
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to appeal. The law is clear that an appeal of the nature 
attempted by Plaintiff is untimely and without basis 
in law. 
The District Court did not abuse its discretion 
in setting aside the Default Judgment. Sufficient grounds 
~ere alleged and the Court, in the interest of justice, 
after hearing the facts and circumstances, certainly was well 
within the standards set forth by this Court. 
Plaintiff's Appeal should be dismissed or in the 
alternative an Order from this Court should uphold the · 
ruling of Judge Rigtrup and remand this matter for further 
hearing to the District Court. 
Respectfully submitted this 
1981. 
eils E. Mo tenson 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
255 East 400 South 
Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 328-1392 
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I hereby certify that on the ~ayof 
1981, I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and c 
above and foregoing Respondent's Brief to Randy Ludlow Attorney 
at Law, 325 South Third East, S lt Lake City, Utah 84111. (}Lb-----
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